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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Solomon, Matthew · .Facility: Otisville CF 
Appeal 
. Control No.: 
NY SID: 07-030-18 SC 
DIN: 89-A-1381 
Appearances: Steven Zeidman, Esq. 
CUNY School of Law Main Street Legal Services 
2 Court Square West 
Long Island City, New York 11101 
Decision appealed: June 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18-months. 
Board Member(s) Berliner, Smith, Crangle, Cruse, Alexander, Shapiro 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived October 11, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement oftl,le Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
: I 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
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Appellant was sentenced to 18 years to life upon his conviction of Murder in the Second 
Degree.  In the instant appeal, Appellant, through counsel, challenges the June 2018 determination 
of the Board denying release and imposing a 18-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the 
decision was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because the Board placed impermissible weight 
on the instant offense without meaningful consideration of other factors such as the sentencing 
court’s recommendation, the sentence imposed and mitigating factors; (2) the Board engaged in 
an “illegal resentencing” of Appellant; (3) the decision was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious 
because the Board failed to adequately address during the interview and placed impermissible 
weight on official opposition by the District Attorney; (4) the decision was unlawful, arbitrary and 
capricious if the Board considered submissions by members of Parents of Murdered Children and 
media coverage as official opposition; (5) the decision was unlawful and violated due process 
because it denied parole in conclusory terms; (6) the Board improperly failed to explain why it 
deviated from the COMPAS as required by State law and the prior Appeals Unit decision; (7) the 
Board violated Appellant’s due process rights by failing to provide a copy of the official opposition 
cited in the decision; (8) the Board violated Appellant’s due process rights by issuing a 
predetermined decision; and (9) the appropriate remedy is release or, alternatively, a de novo 
interview.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  A conclusion that an inmate fails to 
satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an independent 
basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704, 708 (2000); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719; Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  That an inmate 
has served the minimum sentence does not alter or restrict application of this framework.  See 
Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719; Matter of Kozlowski v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 436, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of 
Phillips, 41 A.D.3d at 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 124. 
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While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016).  In the 
absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must 
be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990). 
 
Here, the record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board 
considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense wherein Appellant strangled his 
wife following a dispute on Christmas, dumped her body in a field and participated in a community 
search after reporting her missing; that it is his sole conviction of record; his institutional record 
including completion of  ART, and AVP, participation in the Network program, and good 
discipline; his expression of remorse; and release plans to live with his mother, work in home 
remodeling and continue   The Board also had before it and considered, 
among other things, the sentencing minutes, a favorable official statement from the sentencing 
judge, multiple official statements from the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office and the 
original prosecutor, Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and Appellant’s parole 
packet including letters of support and his letter to the Apology Bank.   
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
Specifically, the Board concluded release at this time would not be compatible with the welfare of 
society and would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law.  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on Appellant’s course of conduct – not only 
murdering his young wife, but also dumping her in a field and then participating in the search for her 
– and official opposition to release.  See Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 
A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 A.D.3d 
1077, 1078, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (3d Dept. 2014), aff’d 26 N.Y.3d 1014, 21 N.Y.S.3d 686 (2015); 
Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 
1995); Matter of Carrion v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 210 A.D.2d 403, 404, 620 N.Y.S.2d 
420, 421 (2d Dept. 1994).  As the weight to be assigned each statutory factor is within the Board’s 
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discretion, it committed no error by emphasizing the severity of the inmate’s offense over other 
factors following its consideration of the full record.  See Matter of Robinson v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 
A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385, 
772 N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 
(1st Dept. 1998).   
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper 
resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the 
propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth 
therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of 
Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested 
with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period 
of incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 
283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d 
Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007); Matter of Maida v. Evans, 2009 
NY Slip Op 32974(U), 2009 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4333 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Dec. 4, 2009).  The 
appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Bonilla v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d Dept. 2006).   
 
Appellant complains that the Board’s reference to “official opposition” is conclusory and 
left him to guess the source: the district attorney, Parents of Murdered Children, or the media.  At 
the same time, however, Appellant acknowledges the sources of official statements received by 
the Board pursuant to the Executive Law are the sentencing court, the district attorney and the 
defense attorney (Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii)) and that the only opposition from an official 
party in this case – which party was mentioned during the interview – was DA opposition.  There 
is no merit to his assertion that the term “official opposition” is conclusory.  Appellant – who 
raised no issue during the interview – also now objects that the Board did not discuss the statements 
in more detail.  However, the nature and extent of a parole interview are solely within the discretion 
of the Board, Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 28-29, 298 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 710 (1969), and the Board is not required to discuss confidential information during 
the interview, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.1(c).  The transcript does not support Appellant’s contention 
that he was denied a fair interview.  Matter of Rivers v. Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 
400 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Bonilla v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 
820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d Dept. 2006).  His contention that the Board could not consider a 
statement by the original prosecutor who tried the case, from his perspective as the trial prosecutor, 
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because he is no longer employed by the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office also is 
incorrect.  While the prosecutor may now be a county judge, there was no confusion on the Board’s 
part concerning the capacity in which he wrote the letter.   And even if the letter did not fall within 
the statutory provision for official statements (and it does), it still could be considered consistent 
with the statute.  See Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2018 NY Slip Op 
08989, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8932 (3d Dept. Dec. 27, 2018); Matter of Clark v. New York 
Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, --N.Y.S.3d -- (1st Dept. 2018).  As to objections concerning the 
weight given the applicable factors, that is a matter that falls squarely within the Board’s discretion.  
See Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717.  The court’s recommendation 
does not abrogate the Board’s discretion.  See Matter of Maida, 2009 NY Slip Op 32974(U), 2009 
N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4333; see generally Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 708.  
 
As to Appellant’s remaining contentions about the official opposition in his case, under no 
plausible reading could “official opposition” in this context refer to a non-profit organization or 
the media.  The decision did not mention, much less rely on, Parents of Murdered Children 
submissions in denying release.  Appellant’s contention that the Board should not even have 
considered any such submissions from the public is incorrect.  See, e.g., Matter of Applewhite v., 
2018 NY Slip Op 08989, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8932; Matter of Clark, 166 A.D.3d 531, --
N.Y.S.3d --; Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 
N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005).  Appellant’s 
claim that the Board may have been influenced by concern about media coverage and treated it as 
“official opposition” is speculative and unsupported.  Further, there is a presumption of honesty 
and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. 
Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The 
Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations.  
See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).  
  
The Board also considered the sentence imposed in addition to the court’s parole 
recommendation.  However, Appellant’s claim that the court’s decision to impose less than the 
maximum sentence reflected recognition of mitigating factors that should have been considered is 
purely speculative and without record support. That Appellant ultimately may have confessed to 
causing his wife’s death – upon arrest after attempting to conceal his crime by hiding his wife’s 
body, claiming she disappeared and participating in the search – did not constitute a mitigating 
factor that the Board was obligated to consider.  To the contrary, his behavior gave rise to 
aggravating factors under the Executive Law.  See, e.g., Matter of Applegate, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 240; Matter of Hynes v. Stanford, 2017 NY Slip Op 32322(U), 2017 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 
4195 (Sup. Ct. Seneca Co. Nov. 3, 2017); Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 
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1236A, 831 N.Y.S.2d 353, 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006).  We further note that the pre-
sentence investigation report and sentencing minutes reveal Appellant maintained his wife’s death 
was an accident.  
 
Appellant does not seriously dispute that the Board considered the applicable factors.  
Indeed, he concedes that a significant portion of his interview focused on positive aspects of his 
file.  Rather, he objects that favorable factors did not receive more attention in the decision.  His 
complaint boils down to an objection to the weight given the applicable factors.  This includes a 
complaint that the Board gave improper weight to official D.A. opposition and insufficient weight 
to the sentencing court’s letter.  However, the Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its 
decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Marszalek v. Stanford, 152 A.D.3d 773, 59 N.Y.S.3d 
432 (2d Dept. 2017); Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  The inmate’s positive 
institutional record does not automatically entitle him to release, as discretionary release shall not be 
granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Gutkaiss v. New York State Div. of Parole, 50 A.D.3d 
1418, 857 N.Y.S.2d 755 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Faison v. Travis, 260 A.D.2d 866, 688 
N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 1013, 697 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1999).  The 
inmate’s positive postconviction activities did not preclude the Board from placing greater 
emphasis on the serious nature of his criminal behavior and official opposition.  See Matter of 
Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719; Matter of Torres v. New York State Div. 
of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 128-29, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Thomas 
v. Superintendent of Arthur Kill Corr. Facility, 124 A.D.2d 848, 508 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dept. 1986), 
lv. denied, 69 N.Y.2d 611, 517 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1987).  The Board considered the recommendation 
of the sentencing court, but, as Appellant correctly notes the court acknowledged, the Board also 
had to weigh other considerations.  The recommendation of the sentencing court did not preclude 
the Board from determining, following its review of all applicable factors, that release would be 
incompatible with the welfare of society and undermine respect for the law.  See Matter of Maida, 
2009 NY Slip Op 32974(U), 2009 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4333; see generally Matter of Hamilton, 119 
A.D.3d at 1272, 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 718, 719. 
 
The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the 
denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240; Matter of Kozlowski, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87; Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d 
Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002).  The 
Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and 
explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations, despite low COMPAS 
scores: namely, Appellant’s course of conduct and official opposition.  The Board was not required 
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to articulate the weight accorded to each factor, Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 
946, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (2d Dept. 2009), or even explicitly mention each factor considered in 
the decision, Matter of Marszalek, 152 A.D.3d 773, 59 N.Y.S.3d 432; Matter of Mullins, 136 A.D.3d 
1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698.  While the Board’s amended regulation reinforces that detailed reasons must 
be given for a denial of release, it did not alter this well-established principle.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.3(b).  And as discussed above, the reference to “official opposition” was not impermissibly 
conclusory.   
 
Appellant also complains that the Board failed to properly explain its departure from the 
COMPAS instrument as required by State law and his prior administrative appeal decision.  
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 Amendment and amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) do not 
represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release 
decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the 
relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 
259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 2011, the Executive 
Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the 
Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this 
requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 
197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 
A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 
30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 
(4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole 
indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, 
including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate 
the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of 
Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular 
result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional 
consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of 
deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) 
did not alter this approach.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk 
and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”).  Indeed, the COMPAS does not (and cannot) 
supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ independent judgment and 
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application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should be released.  See 2011 N.Y. 
Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 
at 870.   
 
The new regulation was intended to increase transparency in the Board’s decision making 
by providing an explanation if and when the Board departs from scales in denying an inmate 
release.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  Here, the Board considered the COMPAS 
instrument and fully complied with the statute and amended regulation’s requirements.  In denying 
Appellant discretionary release to parole, the Board did not depart from COMPAS scores within 
the meaning of the regulation, for example, by finding a reasonable probability that Appellant will 
not live and remain at liberty without violating the law but rather concluded, despite low risk scores, 
release would be inappropriate under the other two statutory standards.  The Board nonetheless 
provided an individualized reason why it was denying release despite low risk scores and could do 
so by addressing his low risk scores collectively.  The suggestion that Appellant’s course of 
conduct was part of the COMPAS such that it could not be the reason for a COMPAS departure is 
incorrect, as is the implication that a denial decision could never place emphasis on an offense.  
See Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter 
of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  Furthermore, the Board did not ignore the prior 
administrative appeal decision.  The Board more clearly articulated why release was denied as 
required by 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d) and the reasons for denial in light of the COMPAS scores.  
While Appellant is correct that the vacated decision also mentioned the offense and opposition, 
read as a whole it failed to adequately articulate the basis for the denial.  The de novo decision 
remedies that error.   
 
Insofar as Appellant alleges due process violations, an inmate has no Constitutional right 
to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates 
of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of 
Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 
A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out 
no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest 
implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; 
see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 
Thus, there is no merit to Appellant’s contention that his constitutional rights were violated 
when he was denied a copy of the official opposition for the purposes of his appeal.  See also Billiteri 
v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976).  The Board may consider 
confidential information, Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 
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991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014), and its consideration of the official DA statements was not 
improper, Matter of Applegate, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240; Matter of Williams v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995).  Appellant is not 
entitled to official DA statements.  See, e.g., Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
11 A.D.3d 850, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dept. 2004); Matter of Ramahlo v Bruno, 273 A.D.2d 521, 
708 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 767 (2000).  This includes official DA 
statements by former prosecutors relating to their work while employed by the office.  See generally 
Matter of Carty v. New York State Division of Parole, 277 A.D.2d 633, 716 N.Y.S.2d 125 (3d 
Dept. 2000).  We understand DOCCS has re-reviewed Appellant’s request for records and, after 
conducting an analysis to determine whether Appellant could be granted access to responsive records, 
produced other material with any necessary redactions.  See, e.g., Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(B); 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c). 
 
Finally, there is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined.  Matter of Gonzalvo 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).   The inmate 
has failed to demonstrate that the use of a worksheet by the interviewing Board members reflected 
a predetermined decision to deny him release to parole.  Duffy v. Evans, No. 11 CIV. 7605 JMF, 
2013 WL 3491119, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2013).  As Appellant concedes, the Board uses 
different forms and the specific reasons for his denial were not pre-typed in the worksheet.  That 
the Board, following a de novo interview, ultimately decides to again deny parole release does not 
mean the decision was predetermined.  Similarly, that the Board considered positive factors and 
found them outweighed by the severity of the crime together with official opposition does not 
mean the decision was predetermined.  Matter of Garcia, 239 A.D.2d 235, 240, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415.   
 
As for Appellant’s claim seeking release, we note that the proper remedy for a successful 
challenge to a parole release decision is a de novo interview.  Matter of Quartararo v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 224 A.D.2d 266, 637 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dept.), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 805, 646 
N.Y.S.2d 984 (1996); accord Matter of Ifill v. Evans, 87 A.D.3d 776, 928 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dept. 
2011); Matter of Lichtel v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 837, 731 N.Y.S.2d 533 (3d Dept. 2001).  
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
